4.4 Organisational work conditions
- Syllabus
- 9990–2028–2029
- Topic
- 4.4
- Level
- A2
Learning objectives
4.4.1Physical work conditions• 4.4.1 Physical work conditions- impact of physical work conditions on productivity and the Hawthorne effect, e.g. Kompier (2006).- impact of the design of the work environment focusing on open plan offices, including a study, e.g. Oldham and Brass (1979).- Relevant issues and debates and methodology for this topic include: determinism versus free-will, experiments, questionnaires, longitudinal studies, quantitative and qualitative data.4.4.2Temporal work conditions• 4.4.2 Temporal conditions of work environments- design of work: shiftwork: rapid rotation and slow rotation, on-call and flexitime including definitions and examples of each.- effects of shiftwork on health and accidents, including a study, e.g. Gold et al. (1992).- Relevant issues and debates and methodology for this topic include: application to everyday life, determinism versus free-will, questionnaires, quantitative and qualitative data, validity.4.4.3Health and safety• 4.4.3 Health and safety- accidents at work focusing on human errors (errors of omission, commission, sequencing and timing) and system errors in operator-machine systems (machine controls and displays).- reducing accidents at work: token economy, including a study, e.g. Fox et al. (1987).- monitoring accidents (exemplified by the following key study).- Key study on the monitoring of accidents and risk events: Swat (1997).- Relevant issues and debates and methodology for this topic include: individual and situational explanations, idiographic versus nomothetic, longitudinal studies, objective and subjective data, generalisations.
Physical conditions affect work through comfort, control and social meaning
| Physical feature | Mechanism that may alter productivity/welfare | Boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Light | Visibility, eye strain and alertness | More light is not always better; glare/task demands matter |
| Noise | Masks signals/speech and divides attention | Predictability, control and task complexity change impact |
| Temperature/humidity | Thermal discomfort and fatigue consume attention | Optimal range varies by clothing, exertion and person |
| Layout | Changes privacy, interruption, communication, autonomy and scrutiny | Productivity, relationships and satisfaction may trade off |
The Hawthorne effect is a change in behaviour attributed to awareness of being studied or receiving special attention, rather than the physical manipulation alone. Kompier's re-analysis warns against treating the Hawthorne studies as a clean experiment: changing samples, supervision, incentives, feedback and historical conditions create rival explanations. ‘Performance rose while observed’ does not by itself prove an attention effect.
| Oldham & Brass (1979) office move | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Design | Longitudinal field study: baseline before movement to open plan, then about one week and six weeks after |
| Measures | Repeated 7-point questionnaires on job characteristics/experiences plus interviews |
| Reported changes | Less privacy/control and concentration; workers used descriptions such as fishbowl/cage/warehouse; close relationships/private feedback became harder |
| Possible trade-off | Open plan can ease access/communication, while enclosed space may improve autonomy, internal motivation and satisfaction but reduce spontaneous contact |
Repeated measures show within-worker change in a real setting and interviews add meaning, but office change is not random: novelty, management, task and time may co-vary, repeated questionnaires can sensitise responses, and attrition can bias later waves. Treat layout as a bundle of conditions, not a deterministic cause.
Work schedules trade biological adaptation against flexibility and control
| Arrangement | Definition/example | Main mechanism/trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Rapid rotation | Frequent changes, e.g. two day, two evening, two night, two off | Repeated circadian disruption; limits prolonged night exposure but adaptation is difficult |
| Slow rotation | Same shift for a longer block before changing | More time to adapt, but long night blocks create sleep/social costs and adaptation may remain incomplete |
| On-call | Worker must be available when summoned outside/flexible scheduled periods | Unpredictability disrupts sleep/recovery and reduces control |
| Flexitime | Worker chooses start/finish within core hours/required total | More control and work-life fit; coordination/coverage must still be managed |
Night and rotating work misalign sleep, alertness and physiology with circadian timing. Sleep loss and reduced vigilance can increase errors and commute risk; schedule predictability, forward timing, rest, workload, individual chronotype and worker choice can moderate—not erase—the effect.
| Gold et al. (1992) | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Design/sample | Hospital questionnaire survey of 635 female Massachusetts nurses |
| Comparison | Rotating-shift nurses versus nurses working only day/evening shifts |
| Findings | Rotators reported more sleep/wake disruption and nodding off at work; about twice the odds of nodding off while driving to/from work and twice the odds of a sleepiness-related accident/error |
| Application | Use circadian principles, adequate recovery and safer rota design to protect nurses, commuters and patients |
The survey studies real workers and quantitative odds permit comparison, but self-reported sleep/errors may involve recall, social desirability and reporting differences. Shift type was not randomly assigned; workload, health, childcare and self-selection can confound the association. Therefore Gold supports a useful risk relationship, not a deterministic causal claim for every worker or job.
Safer systems classify errors, redesign interfaces and learn from near misses
| Human error | What happens | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Omission | Required action is not performed | Eye protection is not put on |
| Commission | Incorrect/inappropriate extra action is performed | Functional control is switched off |
| Sequencing | Correct actions occur in the wrong order | Machine starts before guard is locked |
| Timing | Action is too early, late, fast or slow | Emergency stop is activated after the hazard reaches worker |
| Operator-machine system | Safer design question |
|---|---|
| Controls | Are shape/location/movement compatible, distinguishable and protected against accidental activation? |
| Displays/alarms | Are signals visible/audible, prioritised, interpretable and mapped clearly to the correct control? |
| Work organisation | Are pace, staffing, procedures, supervision, maintenance, PPE and refresher training adequate? |
| Reporting | Can workers report errors/near misses without fear, using common definitions and circumstances? |
A token economy positively reinforces observable safe behaviour: stamps/tokens are earned for injury-free group work, avoiding equipment damage and preventing hazards, then exchanged for valued goods. Fox et al. (1987) introduced this in two open-pit mines; lost-time injuries, days/costs lost and equipment accidents fell, savings exceeded programme costs and reductions lasted for years. Yet rewards require fair, accurate monitoring and must not encourage concealment of incidents or substitute for hazard removal.
| Swat (1997) | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Scope/data | Three-year project in four old Łódź industrial plants, 2,964 employees; analysed 83 1993 accidents using collective reports, individual protocols and supervisor/manager interviews |
| Causes | Insufficient supervision (89%), poor workplace organisation (40%), worker inadvertence (14%), technical factors (11%); some accidents had multiple causes |
| Pattern | At least 45.8% involved housekeeping violations; accident types differed by plant |
| Reporting finding | Follow-up in one meat-processing plant indicated 95% of accidents/minor injuries were not reported |
| Action | Record circumstances, frequency/severity, first-aid events/near misses and housekeeping so repeatable system faults can be corrected |
Recorded data can look objective, but fear of blame/job loss, memory, inconsistent definitions and under-reporting make it incomplete. Low counts may mean concealment, not safety. Combine records with observation/interviews and treat individual error as one link in a system; prevention should make the safe action easy, visible and reinforced while removing hazards at source.