11. International economic issues
- Syllabus
- 9708–2026–2027
- Section
- 11
- Level
- A2
The balance of payments records transactions during a period between residents of an economy and the rest of the world. Receipts/exports of value are generally credits; payments/imports are debits.
| Account | Main contents | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Current | Goods, services, primary income (interest, profits, dividends, compensation) and secondary income/current transfers such as remittances or current aid | Export of services is a credit; dividend paid to an overseas owner is a debit |
| Capital | Capital transfers and acquisition/disposal of non-produced, non-financial assets | Debt forgiveness or transfer of ownership rights to certain intangible assets |
| Financial | Direct investment, portfolio investment, other investment and reserve assets | A foreign firm buys a domestic company: financial-account inflow/credit under the stated convention |
If a resident buys shares in a foreign firm, the asset purchase is a financial-account outflow. Later dividends received from those shares are current-account primary-income credits. The asset and its income therefore belong to different accounts.
A current-account deficit must be financed by net capital/financial inflows, reserve use or an accounting discrepancy. Double-entry accounting makes the full BOP balance in principle, but an individual account can show a persistent imbalance and financing can be unsustainable.
The terms of trade is an index, not a transaction. The trade balance is only part of the current account, and 'the BOP balances' does not mean the current account equals zero or the economy is healthy.
A BOP policy should identify which account is imbalanced, whether the cause is excess income, weak competitiveness, a misaligned exchange rate or financial flows, and whether the position is temporary, structural or unsustainable.
| Required policy | Main BOP route for a current-account deficit | Effectiveness and wider costs |
|---|---|---|
| Fiscal | Higher taxes/lower spending reduce AD, income and imports; supply-oriented public spending can raise competitiveness later | Multiplier and marginal propensity to import; unemployment/growth loss versus long-run capacity |
| Monetary | Higher rates/less credit reduce import demand and may attract financial inflows/appreciation | Interest sensitivity, confidence, fixed/floating regime; appreciation can make exports less competitive |
| Supply-side | Productivity, infrastructure, competition and fewer harmful regulations lower unit costs/raise export capacity | Long lag, fiscal cost and whether foreign demand/domestic firms respond |
| Protectionist | Tariffs/quotas switch spending away from imports; export support may raise receipts | Import PED, domestic supply, consumer/input prices, retaliation, WTO constraints and welfare loss |
| Exchange-rate | Depreciation/devaluation makes exports cheaper and imports dearer in foreign/domestic currency terms | Marshall-Lerner, J-curve, spare capacity, imported inflation and foreign-currency debt |
For an unwanted current-account surplus, reverse the relevant pressure: appreciation, lower trade barriers/export support, or expansionary demand policy can raise imports/reduce net exports. The choice still depends on inflation, capacity and the reason the surplus exists.
With a fixed exchange rate, a domestic interest-rate rise can reduce imports and attract capital, improving current and financial accounts; under a float the resulting appreciation may later weaken exports. The same instrument therefore has account and regime-specific effects.
Financing a deficit with FDI is not the same as correcting its current-account cause. Improving the current account by recession is also not cost-free success; compare inflation, employment, growth, distribution and sustainability.
| Approach | Meaning | Deficit instruments and route | Main strengths and costs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expenditure-switching | Change the composition of spending between foreign and domestic output | Depreciation/devaluation, tariffs/quotas, export subsidies and competitiveness-oriented supply measures raise relative demand for domestic output/exports | Can target external demand without deliberately shrinking all AD; depends on elasticities/capacity and risks imported inflation, distortion and retaliation |
| Expenditure-reducing (dampening) | Lower total domestic expenditure/AD | Higher direct taxes, lower government spending, higher interest rates or lower money/credit reduce incomes and imports; weak home demand may release output for export | Works when import demand is income-sensitive/high marginal propensity to import; costs output, jobs and confidence and may not fix structural competitiveness |
For a current-account surplus, switching measures can be reversed by removing export subsidies/protection or allowing appreciation; reducing policy is generally the wrong direction if the aim is to increase imports, while expansionary demand can reduce the surplus by raising import spending.
Choose by cause and parameters. Switching is stronger when export/import demand responds to relative prices and domestic supply can expand. Reducing is relatively stronger when price elasticities are low but the marginal propensity to import is high. Persistent structural deficits often need supply-side improvement; overheating deficits may respond faster to demand restraint.
A tariff raises the relative price of imports and switches some demand to domestic goods. A rise in income tax lowers disposable income and spending on both domestic and imported goods. Both may reduce imports, but only the first is classified by changing relative choice.
A depreciation is switching, not reducing. A recession-driven import fall shows lower expenditure, not improved competitiveness. A policy mix can use both routes, but evaluation must count unemployment, inflation, consumer choice, retaliation and time.
| Measure | What it measures | Main use |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal bilateral exchange rate | Price of one currency in another at the stated date | Convert currencies and track market/official appreciation or depreciation |
| Real exchange rate | Nominal rate adjusted for relative domestic/foreign price levels | Compare price competitiveness after inflation differences |
| Trade-weighted exchange-rate index | Index of bilateral currency values weighted by each partner's share of the country's trade | Summarise currency movement against the important trading-partner basket |
Always state the quotation. If E is domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, a rise in E is a nominal depreciation and a common real-rate convention is RER = E x P_foreign / P_domestic; a rise is a real depreciation. If the quotation is reversed, the interpretation/formula direction reverses too.
ΔTWI ≈ Σ(w_i × Δe_i)
Base index 100: 80% of trade is with partner A and the currency rises 10% against A; 20% is with B and it rises 50%. Weighted change = 0.80 x 10% + 0.20 x 50% = 18%, so the new simplified index is 118.
Trade weights are partners' relative shares of total trade, not trade as a share of GDP or the terms of trade. A nominal appreciation can coexist with a real depreciation under a reversed quotation/large inflation differential, so define the convention before concluding competitiveness.
| System | Determination rule | Intervention commitment |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed/peg | Official parity or very narrow band | Authorities defend the target continuously/when threatened |
| Managed float | Market determines most movements within an unstated/stated range | Authorities intervene selectively to limit volatility or steer the rate |
| Market pressure | Direct intervention | Supporting action and cost |
|---|---|---|
| Excess supply/downward pressure on domestic currency | Central bank buys domestic currency and sells foreign reserves | Raise interest rates, tighten fiscal policy or restrict capital outflow/import demand; reserves fall and domestic objectives may suffer |
| Excess demand/upward pressure | Central bank sells domestic currency and buys foreign currency | Lower rates/expand demand or relax controls; reserves rise and inflation risk may increase |
If a fixed rate is set above the market equilibrium under a domestic-currency-per-foreign quotation convention, translate carefully; in any diagram identify whether the official price creates excess demand or supply for the named currency, then make the authority absorb that gap. Never choose buy/sell action from 'above' alone without reading axes.
A peg gives predictable trade prices and possible anti-inflation credibility, but consumes reserves and monetary autonomy. A managed float needs less continuous defence and absorbs some shocks through the rate, but offers less certainty and still requires reserves/credibility.
A fixed rate does not eliminate demand/supply pressure; it transfers adjustment to reserves, rates, controls, output or a later parity change. Persistent current-account deficits or capital flight can exhaust reserves and force devaluation/exit.
A revaluation is an official increase in the value of a currency under a fixed or managed regime; a devaluation is an official decrease. They differ from appreciation and depreciation, which usually describe market movements.
Revaluation makes imports cheaper and exports less competitive; devaluation tends to reverse those effects, subject to elasticities, imported inputs, debt currency and policy credibility.
If a government changes a peg from 1 unit = 1.20to1.30, the currency has been revalued under that quotation; changing it to $1.10 is a devaluation.
Do not use appreciation/depreciation for an announced parity change without noting the regime, and do not assume devaluation automatically improves the trade balance.
| Feature | Fixed | Managed float | Free float |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rate adjustment | Official parity changes rarely | Market movement plus selective intervention | Continuous market movement |
| Reserves/defence | High potential requirement | Moderate/variable | No routine target defence |
| Monetary autonomy | Constrained by parity | Partial | Greater, subject to inflation/financial goals |
| Stability/credibility | More predictable if credible | Middle ground | Potential volatility/overshooting |
| Shock absorption | Reserves, rates, wages/prices and output | Shared between rate and policy | Exchange rate adjusts most directly |
When an overvalued fixed rate with a persistent deficit is released to float, excess currency supply may cause depreciation: competitiveness may improve, while imports and foreign-currency debt become dearer. If the prior parity was undervalued/surplus pressure dominates, the float may appreciate instead.
Under a fixed rate, higher domestic inflation than partners weakens export competitiveness and raises imports, creating pressure to devalue. Maintaining the parity instead may require reserve loss and contractionary policy, shifting the burden to output and unemployment.
Evaluate regime change by reserve adequacy, inflation credibility, trade exposure, capital mobility, financial balance sheets, shock type and institutional commitment. Certainty benefits traders; autonomy helps respond to domestic shocks.
A float is not guaranteed stable or instantly self-correcting, and a peg does not permanently remove a deficit. A regime change determines the adjustment process, not a guaranteed exchange-rate or trade outcome.
|PED_X| + |PED_M| > 1
In the simplified Marshall-Lerner model, a depreciation/devaluation improves the trade/current-account balance in the long run when the absolute price elasticities of demand for exports and imports sum to more than one. Neither elasticity must individually exceed one.
If |PED_X| = 0.7 and |PED_M| = 0.6, the sum is 1.3, so the condition is met. Export quantities rise and import quantities fall enough, in value terms under the model assumptions, to outweigh the immediate price change.
| Period after depreciation | Price/quantity response | Likely current-account path |
|---|---|---|
| Immediate/short run | Import prices in domestic currency rise; contracts, habits and quantities adjust slowly, so demand is inelastic | Import bill may rise and balance worsen: downward part of J |
| Adjustment | Buyers substitute, export orders/production respond and elasticities increase | Deterioration bottoms out |
| Long run | If Marshall-Lerner holds and supply can expand | Export receipts/import saving improve balance above its starting path |
For appreciation/revaluation, reverse the long-run direction: when the condition holds, exports weaken and imports rise, tending to worsen a deficit or reduce a surplus. With low short-run elasticities, the current-account value may initially move in the opposite direction before quantities adjust.
The elasticity sum is not sufficient for every macro objective. Also test export supply capacity/PES, spare capacity, imported-input share and inflation, relative foreign income/inflation, retaliation/protection, competitor currencies, pass-through, foreign debt and time. Meeting Marshall-Lerner does not guarantee immediate improvement or low inflation.
Development is a broad improvement in material living standards, health, education, capabilities and economic security. Classification systems group economies using income, human-development or structural indicators, but each has a purpose and limitation.
A single label can hide regional, gender or rural differences. Compare the indicator, threshold, date and population covered before drawing a conclusion.
Two economies with similar income per person may differ greatly in life expectancy or schooling; one may be more developed on a human-capability measure even if the income rank is similar.
Development is not identical to growth, and a classification is not a complete judgement about every household’s welfare.
Income classification assigns economies to low, lower-middle, upper-middle or high-income groups using a stated measure of national income per person, conversion method, threshold set and year. The exact monetary cut-offs are periodically revised, so quote the source/date rather than treating them as permanent.
| Method choice | What it changes |
|---|---|
| GNI rather than GDP | Includes residents' net primary income from abroad |
| Per person | Divides by population, but remains an average |
| Market/Atlas-type currency conversion | Gives a common currency but can move with exchange rates |
| PPP conversion | Compares purchasing power of a similar basket and often changes cross-country ranking |
| Current versus real values | Inflation-adjusted real values are needed for change over time |
The bands are useful for broad eligibility, finance and comparison, but two economies in one band can differ in poverty, inequality, health, education, informal/subsistence output, public services and environmental conditions.
An economy can cross into a higher income band because average GNI per head rises while median income, rural services or wealth distribution barely improve. Its income classification changed; a full development judgement still requires other indicators.
Income per capita is not median income, wealth or quality of life. With zero exact objective-matched rows, this card deliberately teaches only the stable classification method and limitations, not a fabricated current threshold table.
| Monetary indicator | Meaning for comparison |
|---|---|
| Real GDP per capita | Inflation-adjusted domestic output divided by population |
| Real GNI per capita | GDP plus residents' net primary income from abroad, then adjusted for prices/population |
| Real NNI per capita | GNI less depreciation/capital consumption, then adjusted per person; closer to net sustainable income from the measured capital stock |
| PPP-adjusted income | Converts currencies using the cost of a comparable basket rather than only market exchange rates, improving purchasing-power comparison |
Monetary comparisons can mislead because of income/wealth distribution, informal/subsistence/unpaid activity, different price baskets and data quality, exchange-rate volatility, output composition, pollution/resource depletion, leisure/working hours, public services and population structure. Use real per-capita and PPP measures, then add distributional and non-monetary evidence.
Non-monetary indicators include life expectancy, infant/child mortality, nutrition, literacy/schooling, access to healthcare, safe water, sanitation, electricity and housing, employment/security, environmental quality and freedom/capabilities. Each needs a precise definition and disaggregated coverage.
| Composite/model | Components or adjustment | What it adds and misses |
|---|---|---|
| HDI | Life expectancy; education (expected and mean years of schooling); GNI per capita | Combines health, knowledge and income, but omits many environmental/distributional dimensions and averages within countries |
| MEW | Starts from measured output/consumption and adds items such as leisure/non-market work while subtracting regrettable expenditure and harms such as pollution | Can fall when GDP rises with environmental damage, but monetary valuation is contestable |
| MPI | Deprivations in health (nutrition/child mortality), education (schooling/attendance) and living standards (fuel, sanitation, water, electricity, housing, assets) | Identifies overlapping deprivation, but weights/data/coverage matter and school attendance is not learning quality |
The Kuznets curve is an inverted-U hypothesis: inequality on the vertical axis initially rises as income per capita/development on the horizontal axis increases, reaches a turning point, then falls as structural change, education, political redistribution and wider opportunities spread gains. It describes a possible historical relationship, not an automatic law or proof of causation.
No indicator is complete. A higher HDI does not mean every component/group improved; MPI is multidimensional deprivation, not simply low income; PPP improves price comparability but not distribution; and MEW/Kuznets depend on assumptions. Triangulate rather than rank from one number.
g_{RPC} ≈ g_{NI} - π - g_N
Over time: use the same real per-capita measure/base, calculate percentage change, then check distribution, employment, health/education and environmental sustainability. Between countries: compare levels as well as growth rates, use PPP for price differences, align year/definitions and add non-monetary/composite evidence.
If nominal national income rises 5%, prices rise 4% and population rises 2%, approximate real income per head changes by 5 - 4 - 2 = -1%. Aggregate money income grew, but average real purchasing power fell slightly.
Country A has real income per head 40,000 growing 1%; B has 10,000 growing 6%. B is catching up faster but remains lower in level. Development improves more plausibly when gains reach labour-intensive employment, basic services and broad households rather than relying only on finite-resource extraction.
| Comparison question | Evidence needed |
|---|---|
| Material average | Real PPP-adjusted income/consumption per capita |
| Distribution | Median/income shares, poverty and Gini/Lorenz evidence |
| Non-material welfare | Health, education, housing, water, environment, working conditions/leisure |
| Sustainability | Natural-capital depletion, pollution, fiscal/external viability and productive capacity |
A faster growth rate is not a higher present living standard; higher GDP is not automatically development; and one country's average can rise while poorer groups lose. Treat correlation in a short table as evidence, not proof of cause.
| Indicator | Standard measurement |
|---|---|
| Birth rate | Live births per year / total population x 1000 |
| Death rate | Deaths per year / total population x 1000 |
| Infant mortality rate | Deaths before age 1 / live births in the year x 1000 |
| Net migration | Immigrants - emigrants; net migration rate divides this by population x 1000 |
| Population change | Births - deaths + net migration (ignoring statistical adjustment) |
| Urbanisation level | Urban population / total population x 100 |
| Change | Important causes and structural effects |
|---|---|
| Birth/fertility falls | Female education/employment, contraception, urban child costs, pensions and lower infant mortality; youth share later falls |
| Death/infant mortality falls | Nutrition, sanitation, clean water, vaccines/healthcare and income; population may initially grow faster and later age |
| Net inward migration | Wage/job/security/education pull and conflict/poverty push; labour/AD/tax base rise but housing/services face pressure |
| Net outward migration | Remittances may improve current transfers, but brain drain/worker loss can reduce capacity |
| Longer life expectancy/ageing | Larger old-age dependency, health/pension demand and possible saving/labour-supply changes |
Optimum population is the population size that maximises real output/income per head given the current natural resources, capital and technology. Below it, more labour/specialisation may raise output per head; above it, congestion and scarce factors may lower it. Better technology, capital, productivity or usable resources shift the optimum upward; a higher birth rate alone does not.
Urbanisation rises through rural-urban migration, natural increase in towns and reclassification of settlements. It can improve agglomeration, jobs and service access, but rapid unplanned growth can create congestion, housing/infrastructure shortages, pollution and informal employment while rural areas lose workers.
A falling population-growth rate does not mean population is falling while the rate remains positive. Read absolute numbers separately from percentages, and distinguish total dependency/age structure from a single birth or death rate.
A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentage of households/people, ordered poorest to richest, on the horizontal axis against their cumulative percentage of income (or wealth) on the vertical axis. The 45-degree line is perfect equality; the Lorenz curve lies on/below it.
Gini = A / (A + B)
A is the area between the equality line and Lorenz curve; B is the area under the Lorenz curve within the equality triangle. If source areas are labelled X and Y, identify geometry rather than letters: numerator is the inequality gap and denominator is the whole triangle below equality.
| Change | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| Curve moves closer to equality line | Distribution becomes more equal; Gini falls toward 0 |
| Curve bows farther away | Distribution becomes more unequal; Gini rises toward 1 |
| Gini = 0 | Perfect equality in the measured distribution |
| Gini = 1 | Theoretical perfect inequality: one unit receives all measured income/wealth |
More progressive direct taxes, targeted transfers, minimum wages or broader education/asset access may reduce post-policy inequality; regressive indirect taxes, weaker inheritance/capital-gains taxation or long-term unemployment may increase it. The observed effect depends on behavioural responses and whether data are pre/post tax and income or wealth.
Gini measures relative distribution, not average income or poverty. Two countries can share a Gini with different Lorenz shapes and income levels, and wealth is usually distributed differently from income. State population, income definition, tax/transfer treatment and year before comparing.
| Sector | Main activity | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Primary | Extract/cultivate natural resources | Agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining |
| Secondary | Transform materials/build capital and structures | Manufacturing, processing, construction |
| Tertiary | Provide market/public services | Retail, transport, finance, health, education, tourism, digital services |
| Broad development pattern | Employment/productivity mechanism | Typical risk |
|---|---|---|
| Lower-income | High primary employment, often labour-intensive/subsistence and underemployment | Low productivity, volatile commodity income and limited formal jobs |
| Industrialising/emerging | Labour shifts toward manufacturing/construction and urban services; capital/skills raise productivity | Displacement, urban pressure, pollution and unequal regional gains |
| Higher-income | Lower primary employment share and larger/high-value tertiary plus advanced manufacturing | Service-sector size can hide low-paid work/deindustrialisation; output shares differ from employment shares |
| Development context | Common trade pattern | Consequences/conditions |
|---|---|---|
| Commodity-dependent lower-income | Export primary commodities; import machinery, manufactures and some services | Price volatility, deteriorating terms/foreign exchange risk; resource endowment can still generate high income |
| Industrialising | Rising manufactured exports, imported capital/intermediate inputs and participation in global value chains | Learning/jobs/export diversification versus import dependence and low value capture |
| Higher-income/diversified | More high-value manufactures/services, intra-industry trade, capital/technology and complex value-chain flows | Greater diversification but exposure to financial/service/global shocks |
Mechanisation can reduce agricultural employment while farm output rises; released workers may enter manufacturing/logistics. A falling primary employment share therefore does not prove primary output fell, and an expanding service share must be evaluated by productivity and job quality.
These are common patterns, not a ranking rule. Geography, natural resources, institutions, technology, policy and trade agreements can produce exceptions. Use sector shares and trade composition alongside income, productivity, informality and human-development evidence.
International aid is assistance transferred on non-commercial or concessional terms to relieve humanitarian need or support development. Official aid comes from governments/public agencies; private NGO relief is assistance but not official foreign aid.
| Dimension | Forms and exam distinction |
|---|---|
| Purpose | Humanitarian/emergency relief versus long-run development aid |
| Route | Bilateral: donor government to recipient; multilateral: through an international organisation |
| Finance | Grant: no repayment; concessional loan: repayment on softer-than-market terms; debt relief |
| Resource | Money, food/equipment in kind, technical assistance/training |
| Conditions | Tied aid requires specified donor goods/services; untied aid leaves procurement choice |
| Possible benefit | Limitation/condition |
|---|---|
| Infrastructure, health, education and technology raise productivity/capacity | Poor project choice, corruption or weak maintenance can waste resources |
| Foreign exchange and capital relax savings/import constraints | Loans add debt service; tied purchases may be expensive |
| Emergency relief protects lives and productive assets | Repeated dependence can weaken local initiative or production |
| Training and public services improve human development | Benefits may reach narrow groups or follow donor political priorities |
Evaluate importance against the recipient's binding constraint and the counterfactual: grants for productive, locally owned projects with maintenance and accountable delivery are more likely to raise long-run living standards than debt-financed consumption or donor-led projects with weak local capacity.
Aid is not automatically a grant, bilateral, untied or development-enhancing. Classify each dimension separately before judging short-run relief, long-run capacity and repayment/dependency effects.
| Channel | Development mechanism | Main condition/risk |
|---|---|---|
| Trade access | Larger export markets, specialisation, foreign exchange, imported capital/technology and competition | Commodity volatility, trade barriers, weak terms of trade, import displacement |
| Cross-border investment | Adds capital, infrastructure, management, technology and productive capacity | Profit/interest outflows, imported inputs/labour, debt, enclave activity and external costs |
| Labour/remittances | Wages sent home raise secondary income, household spending/saving and foreign exchange | Brain drain, dependency and unequal access |
‘Trade not aid’ argues for durable earning capacity through greater access to high-income markets, not autarky, import substitution or using aid to subsidise exports. Removing rich-country agricultural subsidies can improve developing-country producers' competitive access.
Both partners can gain when exchange uses comparative advantage and contracts are fulfilled: for example, seasonal workers fill a labour shortage while remitted wages benefit home households. Infrastructure investment can raise both countries' trade capacity, but imported construction inputs, tied loans and repayment can shift gains.
For any case, trace (1) immediate AD and foreign-exchange flows, (2) productive-capacity and skill effects, (3) domestic supplier/job/tax linkages, and (4) later import, profit, interest and wage outflows.
More trade or investment is not automatically development. Low investment is often associated with low income, but direction of causation and distribution of gains must be evaluated.
A multinational company (MNC) owns or controls productive operations in more than one country. Exporting or trading internationally alone is insufficient: the firm must conduct production/business operations across countries.
MNCs may build or acquire factories, extract resources, organise global supply chains, contract local suppliers, transfer technology/management, train workers, sell locally and export. These activities usually involve FDI, but MNC describes the firm while FDI describes the investment flow/asset.
| Potential host gain | Potential host cost or leakage |
|---|---|
| Jobs, training, productivity and technology transfer | Imported skilled labour/inputs or only low-paid local jobs |
| Higher AD, GDP/GNI, exports and infrastructure | Repatriated profit, imported inputs and exchange-rate/resource effects |
| Tax revenue and supplier/market access | Tax concessions/avoidance and strong bargaining power |
| Diversification and competition | Domestic-firm displacement, structural unemployment and monopoly power |
| Resource development | Pollution, depletion, cultural/non-material costs and corruption |
Judge net contribution by local value added, worker/supplier linkages, technology retained, taxes collected, reinvestment, competition and external costs—not by gross MNC sales. Host tax, labour, environmental and local-content rules alter each channel.
MNC presence does not always promote growth or living standards. It can raise actual/potential output while worsening distribution, non-material welfare or the current account through imports and profit outflows.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is cross-border investment giving a lasting interest and significant influence/control in an enterprise, commonly by building fixed capital (greenfield investment) or acquiring an existing firm. Short-term purchases without control are portfolio investment.
| Route | Likely effect | Condition |
|---|---|---|
| Initial capital/factory spending | Financial-account inflow and higher AD; multiplier if spare capacity | More domestic inputs/labour increase local multiplier |
| Capital, training and technology | Higher productivity, LRAS/potential growth, wages and consumption | Spillovers require local skills/suppliers |
| Export production/import substitution | Current account may improve | Stronger when local inputs are high and foreign demand is income-elastic |
| Imported machinery/materials | Current-account debit during setup/production | Domestic sourcing reduces leakage |
| Profit repatriation | Primary-income outflow and GNI below corresponding GDP contribution | Reinvestment/tax collection retain more gains |
| Competition/resource use | Lower prices/efficiency or displaced firms; possible depletion/pollution | Regulation and market structure matter |
Investors consider market size, infrastructure, skills/productivity, political/currency stability, costs, tax/rules and ability to repatriate profit. Low wages and cheap land may not compensate for unreliable transport, power or institutions.
Assess standard-of-living effects through employment/income, public revenue and services, consumer choice, distribution and environmental/non-material costs. An observed FDI-growth correlation alone does not establish causation.
An FDI inflow can improve the financial account while imported inputs or later profits worsen current-account components. Do not infer the whole balance of payments, trade balance or welfare effect from one flow.
External debt is the stock of public or private liabilities owed to non-residents. It may be short/long term and domestic/foreign-currency denominated; debt service is the interest plus principal repayments due over a period.
| Cause | Why foreign borrowing rises |
|---|---|
| Savings/investment gap | Low income and saving cannot finance infrastructure, capital and technology |
| Foreign-exchange gap | Export receipts/reserves cannot fund essential imports or current-account deficits |
| Fiscal deficit/shock | Disaster, conflict, recession, commodity-price fall or pandemic raises spending/reduces revenue |
| Cheap global credit | Low foreign interest rates encourage projects and refinancing, sometimes beyond productive use |
| Exchange/interest movement | Depreciation or variable-rate rises inflate the burden and may trigger more borrowing/rollover |
| If well used and manageable | If returns/terms are weak |
|---|---|
| Infrastructure/capital raise AD, LRAS, productivity, exports and tax revenue | Interest/principal outflows worsen primary income and use foreign exchange |
| Growth can exceed borrowing cost and lower debt relative to GNI | Fiscal austerity/crowding out reduces health, education or investment |
| Longer maturities/concessional rates create adjustment time | Rollover/default risk, lower creditworthiness and policy dependence rise |
| Export-generating projects supply repayment currency | Depreciation makes foreign-currency debt costlier in domestic terms |
Judge sustainability using debt and debt service relative to GNI/government revenue/export earnings, real growth versus effective interest cost, maturity/rollover profile, currency denomination, reserve access and project returns. A smaller debt-to-GNI ratio can occur even when nominal debt rises if GNI grows faster.
External debt is not the annual current-account deficit or total national/public debt. A large stock is not automatically unsustainable, and low initial interest rates do not remove exchange-rate, refinancing or project-quality risk.
| IMF role | Economic purpose |
|---|---|
| Surveillance and policy advice | Identify macro, financial, exchange-rate and external risks |
| Temporary lending to members with balance-of-payments/foreign-exchange problems | Finance essential imports and avoid disorderly default while adjustment occurs |
| Promote international monetary cooperation and exchange stability | Reduce destabilising policies and payment-system disruption |
| Technical assistance/capacity development | Improve monetary, fiscal, statistical and financial institutions |
A programme provides foreign exchange and credibility subject to agreed policy conditions and repayment. Fiscal, monetary, exchange-rate or structural measures aim to reduce the financing gap and restore sustainability rather than finance a permanent deficit.
| Potential benefit | Potential cost/condition |
|---|---|
| Prevents abrupt import compression/default and buys adjustment time | Conditional austerity or tight policy can reduce output, jobs and public services short term |
| Restores confidence/reserves and may unlock other finance | Forecast/design errors, weak ownership or poor implementation can fail |
| Corrects unsustainable external/fiscal policies | Distributional burdens and political resistance may be severe |
The IMF is not primarily a development-project bank: a water-treatment plant or long-run infrastructure project is normally a World Bank-type role. IMF support is not free aid and may also follow disasters only where an external financing need exists.
The World Bank Group provides long-term development finance, grants/concessional support for eligible countries, policy advice, research and technical knowledge. Typical areas include infrastructure, health, education, social protection, institutions and private-sector development.
| Project chain | Success condition |
|---|---|
| Identify a development constraint | Evidence supports the priority and opportunity cost |
| Finance infrastructure/services/institutions | Loan/grant terms and debt burden are suitable |
| Procure and implement | Governance, local capability and environmental/social safeguards work |
| Operate and maintain | Recurrent finance, skills and community access exist |
| Convert outputs to outcomes | Benefits reach intended groups and raise productivity/welfare |
A well-selected water, transport, health or education project can improve human capital, productivity, market access and potential growth. Weak selection, corruption, tied/import-intensive construction, displacement, environmental harm or missing maintenance can leave debt without durable benefits.
| IMF | World Bank |
|---|---|
| Shorter-term balance-of-payments and macro-financial stabilisation | Longer-term development projects, capacity and structural constraints |
| Foreign-exchange support linked to macro adjustment | Project/programme finance and development knowledge |
World Bank financing does not prove development occurred: evaluate implementation, access, maintenance, distribution and debt terms. Short-term bailout packages for an external-account crisis are principally the IMF role.
Globalisation is the increasing integration and interdependence of economies and societies through cross-border flows of goods, services, capital, people, technology and ideas.
It can expand markets, specialisation, competition and knowledge transfer, but can also transmit shocks, intensify inequality, weaken bargaining power or increase environmental pressure. Effects differ by sector, country and group.
A global supply chain can lower consumer prices and spread production know-how, yet a port closure or financial shock can disrupt several countries at once.
Globalisation is not a single policy or an automatic benefit; distinguish openness from the distribution and resilience of its effects.
| Form | Internal barriers | External policy | Additional integration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preferential trade area | Some member barriers reduced | Independent | Limited preferences |
| Free trade area (FTA) | Tariffs/quotas substantially removed among members | Each member keeps own tariffs; rules of origin prevent trans-shipment | Goods/services market access |
| Customs union | Internal free trade | Common external tariff (CET) | Members cannot independently set non-member tariffs |
| Common market | Customs union | Common external trade policy | Freer movement of labour and capital |
| Economic union | Common market | Shared external framework | Wider coordination/harmonisation of economic policies |
| Monetary union | May accompany deep integration | Joint monetary framework | Common currency or irrevocably fixed rates and common monetary policy |
The decisive FTA-customs-union difference is the common external tariff. Both remove internal tariffs; only the customs union requires members to apply the same tariff to non-members. A shared currency is a monetary-union feature, not a necessary customs-union feature.
| Potential gain | Potential cost/condition |
|---|---|
| Specialisation, scale, competition, lower prices, quality/choice and productivity | Structural unemployment and unequal regional/sectoral adjustment |
| Larger market attracts FDI and strengthens bargaining/political links | Rules/non-tariff barriers may still restrict trade |
| Trade creation and stronger within-bloc supply chains | Trade diversion from efficient outsiders |
| Factor mobility can fill skill/capital gaps | Migration tensions/brain drain and congestion |
| Common policy/currency can reduce transaction and exchange uncertainty | Loss of tariff, monetary or wider policy sovereignty; one policy may not fit all |
Deeper integration is not automatically better: compare market size/complementarity, creation versus diversion, mobility and adjustment support, common-policy fit, non-tariff rules and the value placed on national policy autonomy.
A member signing its own non-member tariff deal weakens a customs union's CET. Wage differences or currency changes alone do not dissolve the customs-union rule.
| Outcome after integration | Supplier switch | Core welfare tendency |
|---|---|---|
| Trade creation | Higher-cost domestic production is replaced by lower-real-cost member imports | Resources reallocated toward efficiency; lower price raises consumption and reduces costly domestic output |
| Trade diversion | Lower-real-cost non-member imports are replaced by higher-real-cost member imports because the CET changes tariff-inclusive prices | World production cost rises; member trade expands but efficiency may fall |
Use three steps: (1) add the old/new ad valorem or specific tariff to each foreign price; (2) choose the cheapest available supplier before and after integration; (3) compare suppliers' pre-tariff resource costs. Domestic-to-cheaper-member is creation; cheaper-outsider-to-costlier-member is diversion. Both can occur across different products.
In the standard small-country tariff-removal diagram, the domestic price falls from tariff-inclusive import price to the lower partner price. Quantity demanded rises, domestic supply falls and imports expand. Consumer surplus rises; domestic producer surplus and government tariff revenue fall. The two net welfare-gain triangles are the production-efficiency gain plus consumption-efficiency gain.
| Larger likely creation/welfare gain | Smaller likely gain |
|---|---|
| Larger tariff removal/price fall | Small price difference |
| More elastic domestic demand and supply | Inelastic demand/supply or strong home preference |
| High-cost domestic output initially | Little domestic displacement/consumption response |
| Large member scale/competition and dynamic investment effects | High adjustment costs, unemployment or external costs |
Membership does not guarantee net benefit. Add creation/diversion, tariff-revenue and producer/consumer redistribution, structural unemployment, scale/competition, FDI, current-account/multiplier and environmental effects. A tariff-revenue transfer is not by itself a national resource loss; net welfare depends on real efficiency changes and external effects.